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I put forward a new theoretical framework to analyze the relationship between soft budget constraint
syndrome and the economic performances of firms.  It differs from the existing theoretical framework, à la
Dewatripont and Maskin (1995), in the soft budget constraint literature.
In this paper, soft budget constraint syndrome arises when firms that are expected to lose money are
financed.  The paper highlights a trade-off between hard and soft budget constraints.  While soft budget constraints
may compromise firms’ incentives to improve performances, an all-out effort to harden budget constraints may put
macro stability at risk, especially for economies suffering from allocative inefficiency.
Based on this trade-off, the paper shows that a transition from centralized financing to decentralized
financing in fact compromises firms’ incentives to improve their performances, whereas a transition from
centralized financing to a dual track system enhances efficiency.   In the dual track system, budget constraints are
soft in the centralized track but the macro stability of the economy is assured as a result.  The macro stability
enhances the disciplinary effect of hard budget constraints in the decentralized track, which in turn promotes firms’
incentives to improve performances.  The paper sheds light on a complementary relation between soft budget
constraint syndrome in the state sector (i.e., the centralized track) and the remarkable growth of the non-state sector
(i.e., the decentralized track) in China.
Keywords: Soft Budget Constraints, Pecuniary Externality, Financial Dual Track, China’s State Sector and Non-
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1. Introduction
I present in this paper a new theoretical framework for understanding the soft budget constraint syndrome.
Based upon this new theoretical framework, I explore the relationship among the soft budget constraint syndrome,
the performances of enterprises, and the macro stability of an economy.  I use this relationship to shed light on
China’s dual track economic reform.
The soft budget constraint syndrome is a phenomenon where firms that are expected to lose money are kept
in business through subsidized financing (Kornai (1980)).  It is a phenomenon commonly observed in transition and
developing economies.  There is now a growing literature on the soft budget constraint syndrome.  From this
literature emerges one consensus.  According to this consensus, hard budget constraints are needed for good
performances of firms; and to harden budget constraints, measures like decentralized financing are called for.  In
light of this consensus, some experiences in transition economies become rather interesting.
Take China as an example.  Despite the on-going enterprise reform, the financial performances of China’s
state-owned enterprises have deteriorated over recent years.  At the same time, the reform of China’s financial
institution has lagged behind.  The state-owned banks continue to dominate China’s banking sector, and the state
dominated banking sector has become a primary funding source responsible for keeping many of the chronic loss-
making firms alive.  Nevertheless, in spite of the troubled state sector and the lagged reforms in the financial sector,
China has maintained almost double-digit growth throughout the last two decades, fueled by the development of
China’s “non-state” sector.
1
Some questions emerge naturally.  Why didn’t China harden budget constraints of state-owned enterprises
and eliminate the state dominance in the banking sector at the on-set of economic reforms?  Would a decentralized
banking sector along with a credible commitment to hard budget constraints for state-owned enterprises have
unleashed an even greater growth potential?  What had been the relation between the soft budget constraint
syndrome in the state sector and the rapid growth in the non-state sector?
Clues to these questions may be found at the opposite side of China’s experience.  At the opposite side
stand the experiences of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Unions where wholesale reforms were accompanied
by drastic declines in output (Blanchard and Kremer (1997), Roland and Verdier (1999)).  In ten out of the fifteen
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countries of the former Soviet Union, GDP for 1996 was less than half of the 1989 level (Blanchard and Kremer
(1997)).  In some situations, the output fall is in direct association with the government’s effort to harden budget
constraints, such as in the case of Poland (Calvo and Coricelli (1992)).
This sharp contrast motivates a study of the relationship among the soft budget constraint syndrome, the
performances of enterprises and the macro stability of an economy.  The key insight emerging from this study can
be highlighted as follows.
•   Sound performances of enterprises are not possible without a stable macro environment, and a drastic
decline in the state sector endangers a stable macro environment.
•   By avoiding a drastic decline in the state sector, soft budget constraints help stabilize the economy at a
cost of compromising enterprises’ incentives to improve their performances.
•   A dual track system,
2 as the one adopted in China, hardens budget constraints in the non-state sector
while at the same time allows soft budget constraints in the state sector.
  Under the dual track approach,
the state sector contributes to the macro stability.  The macro stability, together with hardened budget
constraints in the non-state sector, enhances enterprises’ incentives to improve performances in that
sector.
•   Thus the relation between the soft budget constraint syndrome in the state sector and the rapid growth
registered in the non-state sector can be complementary.
•   In contrast, an all-out effort to harden budget constraints can be detrimental.
While emphasizing a complementary relation between the state and the non-state sector, this analysis by no
means implies that there is no need for fundamental reforms in the state sector.  On the contrary, I argue at the end
of my analysis that a dual track system is only a half-way measure of economic reform.  While providing a strong
impetus for the non-state sector, a dual track system allows the state sector to delay due restructuring.  However,
such a delay is an inevitable cost paid by an economy that suffers from various kinds of allocative inefficiency.  For
such an economy, it takes much more than simply hardening budget constraints to facilitate restructuring in the state
                                                          
2 The concept of “dual track” originally refers to a practice in China’s price reform.  In the “dual track” price reform, firms were
allowed to produce and sell at market prices at the margin after they fulfilled the state plans (see Li (1994), Lau, Qian, and
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sector.  But it is exactly because all those other measures take time to assert their impacts that an all-out effort to
harden budget constraints is counterproductive and a dual track system becomes attractive.
Following the tradition of Dewatripont and Maskin (1995), I carry out my argument in a comparison of
three financial structures: decentralized financing, centralized financing, and a dual track system.  Under
decentralized financing, there are many funding sources, each of which financing a negligible share of firms in the
economy.  Under centralized financing, one single funding source, such as a government or a state-owned banking
system, finances all firms in the economy.
3  In a dual track system, a large funding source finances some firms in the
economy (the centralized track), while the rest of the firms are financed by many small funding sources (the
decentralized track).  This last financial structure resembles the one in China during its economic transition.
4
This comparison is laid out in a theoretical framework that consists of the following building blocks.  First,
the economy analyzed in this paper may suffer from allocative inefficiency, measured by the share of loss-making
firms the economy is “endowed” with.  I take the presence of a considerable share of such firms as a given feature of
a transition economy, which sets it apart from a matured market economy.
The second building block introduces the issue of commitment.  In particular, some loss-making firms can
avoid losses if they engage in costly restructuring.  But they may be reluctant to do so if they will be financed even
without restructuring.  In this case, a commitment to hard budget constraints can serve as a disciplinary device for
inducing these firms to improve their performances.   A funding source is committed to hard budget constraints if it
extends financing only to firms that are expected to make money.
The last building block is the macro economic condition that impacts the productivity and hence the
profitability of every profit-making firm.  In particular, in this paper, the profitability of a profit-making firm is
positively related to the total number of firms that are financed into operation.  As a result, no profit-making firm
will make much profit when there are not enough firms financed in the economy.  There can be many reasons, either
political or economic, behind the relationship between an individual firm’s profitability and the number of firms
(not) in operation in an economy.  One reason is perhaps that, when many firms get closed down, political unrest
may arise, interrupting the production of those firms in operation.  Another possible reason may be demand spillover
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where increased aggregate demand  (as a result of an increased number of firms being financed) improves each and
every firm’s profitability.
Let me highlight the intuition of how this last building block ties things together and gives rise to an
interesting comparison of different financial structures, without detailing how I will model the exact reason behind
such a relationship later.  I do so because the comparison is qualitatively robust regardless of what are the reasons
behind such a complementary relationship.
Consider a transition economy, which typically has only a limited share of firms that can make profits.  The
rest of the firms either are doomed to fail or need restructuring.   If only firms that can make profits are financed,
there will be too few firms in the economy and as a result, even these firms that can make profits will not make
much profit.  In other words, there is an pecuniary externality in financing.
Under centralized financing, the large funding source internalizes such externality.  Accordingly budget
constraints can be soft.  That is, some of the loss-making firms are financed in equilibrium.
5  Anticipating soft
budget constraints, those that can avoid losses will shun away from necessary restructuring.   This is the situation in
which the existing literature calls for a transition from centralized financing to decentralized financing.  Under
decentralized financing, there is a commitment to hard budget constraints because small funding sources do not
internalize the externality of financing loss-making firms.  Such a commitment is believed, according to the existing
literature, to enhance firms’ incentives to improve their performances.
Nonetheless, such a transition turns out to be unwarranted.  In fact, the commitment to hard budget
constraints brings little efficiency gain under decentralized financing.   On the one hand, macro stability is
endangered as the economy is deprived of the ability to internalize the externality.  And more importantly, firms’
incentives are compromised rather than enhanced.
The reason for the commitment to hard budget constraints to be incentive compromising can be explained
simply.  The disciplinary effect of this commitment depends on how much the firm can gain from turning itself from
                                                          
5 While arguing the concern for macro stability is one of the important reasons why soft budget constraint syndrome arises in
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phenomenon of soft budget constraints (see Lin, Cai and Zhou (1996), Lin and Tan (1999), and Sachs (1996)).  One closely
related factor is that because of price distortions, financial losses in transition economies may not reflect true economic losses.
Another important factor is that financing a loss-making firm is part of the social welfare system.  Social welfare system exists in
modern economies as well, however it takes the form of soft budget constraints because a firm in a former socialist economy is
not only a production unit but also a consumption unit for its employees.  While these factors are particularly relevant for pre-
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a money-loser to a profit-maker.  If the economy stumbles into serious financial troubles and if as a result there are
only meager profits for restructured firms, firms will have no incentives to restructure.
On the contrary, firms’ incentives to restructure can be enhanced if some (but not most) of the loss-making
firms are financed and as a result the macro stability is assured.  In this case, budget constraints are not too soft and
at the same time the profits for restructured firms are increased, thus giving firms better rather than worse incentives
to restructure in the absence of such a commitment.
Thus this paper suggests that a commitment to hard budget constraints is neither sufficient nor necessary
for firms to improve their performances.  Furthermore, it indicates that, when the macro stability is at stake, an all-
out effort to harden budget constraints may lead to a drastic decline in output and a wavering effort in restructuring,
as observed in the experiences of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union.
In contrast, a transition from centralized financing to a dual track system is efficiency enhancing.  A dual
track system, once properly designed, can exploit the “comparative advantages” of both centralized and
decentralized financing.  In the dual track system, the large funding source internalizes the externality within the
centralized track while the small funding sources bring forward a credible commitment to hard budget constraints
within the decentralized track.  As the large funding source internalizes the externality, soft budget constraint
syndrome persists within the centralized track, but at the same time macro stability of the entire economy is assured.
The macro stability ensures high profitability for firms with better performances and as a result enhances the
disciplinary effect of the commitment to hard budget constraints within the decentralized track.  Accordingly, firms
in the decentralized track have stronger incentives to engage in restructuring.  Hence, there is a complementary
relation between the soft budget constraint syndrome in the centralized track and sound economic performances in
the decentralized track.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows.  A simple model is introduced in section 2 where I endogenize
the externality in financing.  Because under each financial structure I study, there is a possibility for equilibrium
multiplicity, I describe in section 3 how various financial structures can be compared in the presence of multiple
equilibria.   Section In section 4, I address why a transition from centralized financing to decentralized financing is
counterproductive.  I demonstrate in section 5 why and when a dual track system is more efficient than centralized
financing.  I relate the insight generated from this model to the Chinese reform experience in section 6.  In theWilliam Davidson Institute Working Paper Number 320
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concluding section, I compare the theoretical framework of soft budget constraints introduced in this paper to the
mainstream framework in the existing literature, a la Dewatripont and Maskin (1995).
2. The Model
Consider an economy that has a continuum of firms in the economy and the continuum is normalized by a
unit interval.  Each firm is assumed to have a fixed production capacity.
6  It can produce φ  units of output by using
one unit of input, labor.  Outputs are sold on an output market where demand is assumed for simplicity to be
perfectly elastic at a price normalized at one.  Firms are liquidity constrained and the purchase of inputs is financed
by some funding sources.
The economy may suffer from allovative inefficiency.  In particular, a firm can be either good or bad in this
economy, and the economy is endowed with only γ  measure of good firms, γ  ∈  (0, 1).  Among those bad firms, there
is a share of firms that can transform themselves into good ones through restructuring.  These firms are referred to as
opportunistic ones.  An opportunistic firm becomes a good firm with restructuring but remains as a bad firm without
restructuring.  Let ρ  denote the share of opportunistic firms among the bad firms, ρ  < 1.
One can think of the rest of the bad firms as “genuinely” bad ones that are incapable of transforming
themselves.  The assumption ρ  < 1 captures the fact that there is a considerable number of firms in many transition
economies that are not viable, regardless of how much effort is devoted into internal restructuring.  These firms
either possess no comparative advantages at the wake of increased foreign competition, or suffer from insensible
resource allocation and huge social welfare burdens inherited from the central planning era.
Financing takes place after restructuring.   Accordingly, a firm is either good or bad on the financial
market.  Information is symmetric on the financial market.  I assume that whether a firm is good or bad is public
information.  Let g(γ ) denote the measure of good firms on the financial market, which include good firms that the
economy is endowed with and any good firms that are transformed from the opportunistic ones.
                                                          
6 What is important to the ensuing analysis is that profit-making firms have fixed production capacities. There would have been
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Pareto improvement could be made. Profit-making firms have fixed production capacities either because of technology reasons
so that additional capacities generate little productivity, or because of allocative reasons so that additional capacities cannot be
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The productivity of a firm φ  depends on the quality of the firm (good or bad) on the financial market and
the skill (high or low) of the labor it hires on the labor market.  As I will indicate later, whether workers will adopt
the high skill depends on macro economic conditions, especially the labor demand.  Therefore, in alternative, one
can think of the labor skill as a proxy of macro economic conditions.
I let φ  = f(η , s) where η  ∈  {η g, η b} represents the quality of the firm, good (η g) or bad (η b) and s ∈  {sh, sl}
denotes the labor skill, high (sh) or low (sl).  Naturally, f(η g, s) ≥  f(η b, s) and f(η , sh) ≥  f(η , sl).  The crucial
assumption of this paper, however, is the complementarity between the quality of an individual firm and the labor
skill (or macro economic conditions).  That is, f(η g, sh) - f(η b, sh) > f(η g, sl) - f(η b, sl).  With no loss of generality, I
adopt a simple specification of φ  to sharpen the intuition.  In particular, I assume that f(η g, sh) = q > 0, f(η b, sh)  ≈  0,
and f(η , sl) = 0.
This specification of a firm’s productivity has two implications.  First, there is a grave consequence when
workers do not have high skills (or alternatively, when the macroeconomic condition becomes bleak): no firm will
make profit, leading to a crash of the financial market, as I will show.  Second, a bad firm will lose money (almost)
irrespective of the input and output prices.  Accordingly, the soft budget constraint syndrome to be analyzed in this
paper cannot be eliminated through price variations.
Information is asymmetric on the labor market.  With probability 1 - θ  > 0, a firm can differentiate the skill
of a worker.  With probability θ , a firm will mistaken low skilled worker for high skilled worker.  I assume for
simplicity that a firm will hire only high skilled worker when it is able to differentiate a worker’s skill.
7
Each worker supplies one unit of labor on the labor market.  Because of different opportunity costs for
supplying their labor on the market (such as entering the informal sector or choosing early retirement), workers have
different reservation wages.  Accordingly the market labor supply function is summarized by a function w(n) where
n is the measure of labor supplied.
Before they are hired on the labor market, each worker may choose whether to adopt the high skill.  To do
so, a worker has to incur a sunk cost F; otherwise the worker will remain as a low skilled labor.  One can think of F
as the training cost spent by a worker.  Presumably, in the context of a transition economy, a worker has to pick up
new skills to accommodate the change in organizational environment within firms and the emergence of market
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institutions outside firms.  Otherwise, the worker will remain as only being capable of working under the traditional
command/planning system.
Since the information is asymmetric on the labor market, a worker is willing to invest in training if and
only if (1 - θ )w ≥  F.  Let w = F/(1 - θ ).  Since the cost F is assumed to be identical among all workers, in equilibrium
either all workers (hired) invest in training or none invests.  Accordingly, an equilibrium wage rate is given by w* =
w(A) where A is the measure of firms financed, which is equal to the market demand for labor.  It then follows that
there exists A, where w(A) = F/(1 - θ ), such that workers will invest in training and thus pick up high skill if and
only if A ≥  A.  As a result, the productivity of a firm can be rewritten as f(η , A) such that f(η , A) > 0 only if η  = η g
and A ≥  A.
8
Accordingly, a funding source makes its financing decision based on the quality of the firm and the
measure of firms financed in the economy.  For simplicity, I assume that funds are perfectly elastically supplied to a
funding source at a price normalized at one.  If a funding source decides to finance a firm, it supplies the fund in
return for an exogenously fixed share of the firm’s profit.  Let α  denote this share.  The assumption of an
exogenously fixed share of profits is made for the purpose of expositional simplicity.  The qualitative analysis
remains the same when funding sources use other pricing methods.  This assumption also ignores competition on the
financial market for the sake of analytical convenience.  However, incorporating competition on the financial market
will not change the qualitative results of my analysis.  Liability is limited.  As a result, loss of a firm will be borne
entirely by its funding source.
9
I now introduce the problem of commitment associated with the opportunistic firms.  I assume restructuring
is costly and denote d as the cost.  I consider a situation where an opportunistic firm will not engage in the costly
restructuring if it will be financed regardless of its restructuring decision.  Following Dewatripont and Maskin
(1995), I model this situation using a crude and yet standard assumption in the soft budget constraint literature that
                                                          
8 Alternatively, I can assume that the cost varies among workers, in which case, some workers will invest and some will not.
Accordingly, in equilibrium, those who invest will all be hired but those who do not invest will be hired with probability θ  only.
It can be then shown that there exists A such that f(., A) will be increasing in A for A ≥  A.  Since my analysis of dual track
system is robust to such an alternative specification, I will focus on the simple case instead for expositional clarity.
9 Because of limited liability, a funding source will be reluctant to finance a firm unless the firm will use its monitoring capacity
to select high skilled labor over low skilled labor.  Evidently, given the specification of f(.,.), a firm always prefers high skilled
labor under profit sharing as long as it expects to make a profit.  When a firm is expected to make a loss, a funding source can
offer the firm a simple contingent contract under which the firm is induced to purchase only high skilled labor.  Given the
specification of f(.,.), such a contract is apparently feasible.  Indeed, only a very small amount of incentive payment is needed for
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an opportunistic firm receives a private benefit B if and only if it is financed with no restructuring taking place.
Presumably, by avoiding restructuring, an opportunistic firm can enjoy some slacks when it is financed into
operation.
I assume that, because the presence of the private benefit, an opportunistic firm will never restructure while
anticipating to be financed regardless of its restructuring decision.  However, it will restructure if it anticipates to be
financed with and only with restructuring.  That is:
Assumption 1: B > (1 - α )(q – w(A)) – d > 0 for A ∈  [0, 1].
I assume further that it is always (jointly) efficient for an opportunistic firm to restructure and a worker to
invest in high skill.
Assumption 2: q – w(1) > d + F.
10
Although Assumption 2 is stated conditional on the full employment of firms, it does not imply that it is
always efficient to have all firms in operation, since some of them can be money loser.  However, since w(A) is
increasing in A, this assumption implies no matter how many firms are funded into operation, it is always
constrained efficient for an opportunistic firm to adopt restructuring.  Assumption 2 also implies that, regardless of
the measure of firms financed, a good firm is always profit making as long as high skilled labor is supplied.   
In the rest of my analysis, I will consider three financial structures: centralized financing, decentralized
financing, and a dual track system.  In centralized financing, there is only one large funding source in the economy
and all firms have to obtain financing from that source.  In decentralized financing, there is a continuum of small
funding sources in the economy and each funding source finances a set of firms of an infinitesimal measure.  A dual
track system is a mix of both centralized and decentralized financing with a centralized track and a decentralized
track.  In the centralized track, there is one large funding source and all firms within that track have to obtain
                                                                                                                                                                                          
expositional simplicity.  Instead, I assume that a loss making firms always prefers high skilled labor even without any incentive
contract.
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funding from that source.  In the decentralized track, there is a continuum of small funding sources and each funding
source finances a set of firms of an infinitesimal measure.
The sequence of events is as follows.  First, opportunistic firms decide whether to restructure or not.  Then
a funding source decides whether it will offer financing to firms.  Once funds are allocated, input market transaction,
production, and output market transactions take place in order.  Then payoffs are distributed.
3. Preliminaries
Both soft and hard budget constraints are defined in this paper as part of an equilibrium outcome. In
contrast, a commitment to hard budget constraints is defined as a funding behavior.  It is therefore possible that,
even without any commitment to hard budget constraints, hard budget constraints may still emerge in equilibrium.
Definition 1 (Commitment to Hard Budget Constraints): A funding source is committed to hard budget constraints if
it never finances a firm that is expected to make a loss.
Definition 2 (Soft versus Hard Budget Constraints): An economy is said to
(1)  suffer from soft budget constraint syndrome in a subgame perfect equilibrium if and only if some bad firms on
the financial market are financed in that equilibrium; and
(2)  have hard budget constraints in a subgame perfect equilibrium when no bad firms on the financial market are
financed in that equilibrium.
During the comparison of the three financial structures, I will address the following issues.  Do firms’
budget constraints become harder or softer under one financial structure vis-à-vis under another financial structure?
Does one financial structure compromise or enhance opportunistic firms’ incentives to restructure as compared to a
different financial structure?  Which financial structure is more constrained efficient?
To address these issues, I need to introduce notions of “harder budget constraints,” “better incentives,” and
“more efficient.”  Under each financial structure, there is a possibility of equilibrium multiplicity for an economy
endowed with γ  measure of good firms, denoted by E(γ ).  Accordingly, these notions are defined by comparing the
set of equilibria for economies under different financial structures.William Davidson Institute Working Paper Number 320
10
Let λ (γ ) be the percentage of bad firms financed in an equilibrium for an economy E(γ ).  Let {λ ix(γ )} be the
set of percentages (with a descending order
11) of bad firms financed in every equilibrium (i ∈  {1, 2, …, n}) when
the economy E(γ ) is under a financial structure X.  Let {λ jz(γ )} (j ∈  {1, 2, …, m}) be the corresponding set when the
economy is under another financial structure Z.
Definition 3 (Softness of Budget Constraints): Consider two financial structures X and Z.
(1)  Budget constraints are said to be softer under X than under Z for an economy E(γ ), if and only if {λ ix(γ )} >
{λ jz(γ )}
12;
(2)  budget constraints are said to be at least as soft under X as under Z for an economy E(γ ), if and only if {λ ix(γ )}
≥  {λ jz(γ )}
13; and
(3)  budget constraints are said to be softer under X than under Z, if and only if budget constraints are at least as soft
under X as under Z for any economy and are softer under X than under Z for some economies.
Notice, however, not every pair of financial structures can be compared in terms of whether budgets are
softer under one than under the other.  In other words, the ordering of financial structures in terms of budget softness
is incomplete.   And so are the ordering of financial structures in terms of their incentive enhancement and the
ordering of financial structures in terms of their (constrained) efficiency, as I define below.
Whether a financial structure generates better incentives for firms to restructure can be measured by how
many opportunistic firms restructure in equilibrium.  Assuming that, in any equilibrium where financing takes place
(i.e., A ≠  0), every good firm on the financial market will be financed.
14  Then it makes sense to quantify “better
incentives” using g*(γ ), the measure of good firms financed in equilibrium.
15
                                                          
11 That is, λ ix(γ ) ≥  λ jx(γ ) for i ≥  j.
12 For any two vectors with a descending order {xi} (i ∈  {1, 2, …, n}) and {yj} (j ∈  {1, 2, …, m}), {xi} > {yj} if and only if one
of the following condition holds: (1) xn ≥  ym, xn-1 ≥  ym-1, … xn-m+1 ≥  y1, when n > m; (2) x1 ≥  y1, x2 ≥  y2, … xn ≥  yn, when n < m;
or (3) xi ≥  yi for all i ∈  {1, 2, …, n} with some holding as strict inequality, when n = m.
13 For any two vectors with a descending order {xi} (i ∈  {1, 2, …, n}) and {yj} (j ∈  {1, 2, …, m}), {xi} ≥  {yj} if and only if one
of the following condition holds: (1) xn ≥  ym, xn-1 ≥  ym-1, … xn-m+1 ≥  y1, when n > m; (2) x1 ≥  y1, x2 ≥  y2, … xn ≥  yn, when n < m;
or (3) xi ≥  yi for all i ∈  {1, 2, …, n}, when n = m.
14 Later, I will show that this is indeed the case under some assumption (see assumption 4 and footnote 17).
15 There of course exists an equilibrium where no good firms are financed, as I will show.  But in such an equilibrium no
opportunistic firm will adopt the costly restructuring.William Davidson Institute Working Paper Number 320
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Again, let {g*ix(γ )} (i ∈  {1, 2, …, n}) be the set of the measures (with a descending order) of good firms
financed in every equilibrium when an economy E(γ ) is under a financial structure X.  And let {g*jz(γ )} (j ∈  {1, 2,
…, m}) be the corresponding set when the economy is under another financial structure Z.
Definition 4 (Incentive Enhancing and Incentive Compromising): Consider two financial structures X and Z.
(1)  X is said not to compromise the incentives to restructure as compared to Z for an economy E(γ ) if and only if
{g*ix(γ )} ≥  {g*jz(γ )};
(2)  X is said to enhance the incentives to restructure as compared to Z for an economy E(γ ) if and only if {g*ix(γ )}≥
{g*jz(γ )} and in addition, g*1x(γ ) > max{g*1z(γ ), γ }; and
(3)  X is said to enhance the incentives to restructure as compared to Z if and only if X does not compromise the
incentives as compared to Z for any economy and enhances the incentives as compared to Z for some
economies.
The condition g*1x(γ ) > max{g*1z(γ ), γ } implies that a financial structure can be incentive-enhancing only if
there exists an equilibrium under the financial structure such that opportunistic firms choose to restructure while
financing takes place on the financial market.
Finally, I introduce the notion of “more efficient.”  As it will turn out later, regardless of what financial
structure an economy has, an equilibrium outcome will have the following property: if g*(γ ) = 0 in equilibrium, then
λ (γ ) = 0; if g*(γ ) ∈  (0, A), λ (γ ) = A - g*(γ ); and if g*(γ ) ≥  A, λ (γ ) = 0.  Therefore, an equilibrium outcome can be
fully characterized by g*(γ ) the measure of good firms financed in equilibrium.   Thus I denote an equilibrium
outcome by [g*(γ )].
Take any two equilibrium outcomes [g*i(γ )] and [g*j(γ )] for an economy E(γ ) regardless of whether these
two equilibrium outcomes come under the same financial structure or not.  I use the conventional notation   and 
to denote “at least as efficient as” and “more efficient”.  Given assumption 3, an equilibrium outcome [g*i(γ )] is said
to be more efficient than another equilibrium outcome [g*j(γ )] if and only if g*i(γ ) > g*j(γ ).  Let {[g*ix(γ )]} (i ∈  {1,
2, …, n}) denote the set of all equilibrium outcomes with a descending order
16 when an economy E(γ ) under a
                                                          
16 That is, [g*i(γ )]   [g*j(γ )] for i ≥  j.William Davidson Institute Working Paper Number 320
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financial structure X.  Let {[g*jz(γ )]} (j ∈  {1, 2, …, m}) denote the corresponding set when the economy is under
another financial structure Z.
Definition 5 (Comparative Efficiency Criterion): Consider two financial structures X and Z.
(1)  X   Z for an economy E(γ ) if and only if one of the following conditions holds:
(a)  [g*nx(γ )]   [g*mz(γ )], [g*n-1x(γ )]   [g*m-1z(γ )], …, and [g*n-m+1x(γ )]   [g*1z(γ )], when n > m;
(b)  [g*1x(γ )]  [g*1z(γ )], [g*2x(γ )]   [g*2z(γ )], …, and [g*nx(γ )]   [g*nz(γ )], when n < m; or
(c)  [g*ix(γ )]   [g*iz(γ )] for all i ∈  {1, 2, …, n} with [g*ix(γ )]   [g*iz(γ )] for some i, when n = m;
(2)  X   Z for an economy E(γ ) if and only if condition (a) or (b) or :
(c’) [g*ix(γ )]   [g*iz(γ )] for all i ∈  {1, 2, …, n} when n = m holds; and
(3)  X   Z if and only if X   Z for any economy and X   Z for some economies.
With these preliminaries laid out, I proceed to the comparison of various financial structures.
4.  From Centralized Financing to Decentralized Financing?
Whether soft budget constraint syndrome will arise in an economy depends on the economy’s financial
structure.  I consider two financial structures in this section: centralized financing and decentralized financing.  I am
interested in the following question.  Is a transition from centralized financing to decentralized financing warranted?
I address the question in two steps.  In the first step, I will ignore the disciplinary effect of the commitment
to hard budget constraints.  In other words, I will fix the behavior of those opportunistic firms by assuming a given
measure of good firms on the financial market g(γ ).  Since financing takes place after restructuring decisions are
made by the opportunistic firms, this step can be regarded as an analysis of a subgame at the financing stage.  I will
incorporate the disciplinary effect of the commitment to hard budget constraints in the second step by endogenizing
g(γ ) as a part of a subgame perfect equilibrium outcome.William Davidson Institute Working Paper Number 320
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4.1.  Soft Budgets versus Credit Crunch
Consider centralized financing first.  Under centralized financing, a single large funding source is
responsible for financing all firms.  To understand how the funding source makes its financing decisions, I divide
the problem into two cases: (1) g(γ ) ≥  A and (2) g(γ ) < A.
(1) g(γ ) ≥  A.  In this situation, the measure of good firms on the financial market is large enough to ensure
macro stability.  It is then evident that the funding source will finance only good firms.  It is also obvious that the
equilibrium measure of good firms financed g*(γ ) ∈  [A, g(γ )].   The only question is whether the funding source will
finance every good firm. The large funding source may want to finance some good firms in order to manipulate the
input price.  For simplicity, I will ignore such a possibility with the following assumption.
Assumption 3: q > w(A) + Aw’(A) for any A ∈  [0, 1].
In other words, the large funding source will finance all good firms when g(γ ) ≥  A.
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(2) g(γ ) < A.  Macro stability is at risk in this case.  To stabilize the economy, a large funding source can
finance some bad firms to make up the input demand.  Since the large funding source will obviously not finance
more bad firms than necessary for stabilizing the economy, its funding decision will be dictated by the following
simple condition:
A = A if π (w) ≥  0, and A = 0 otherwise,
where π (w) = g(γ )α (q – w) - (A – g(γ ))w is the profit accrued to the funding source.   Since π (w) is increasing in
g(γ ), there must exist a threshold of g(γ ) beyond which the large funding source will simply give up its attempt to
stabilize the economy.  Define γ  as such a threshold, that is:
(A – γ )/γ  = α (q – w)/w.
Figure 1-a highlights the equilibrium outcomes of the subgame at the financing stage under centralized
financing.  In Figure 1, when g*(γ ) ∈  (0, A), budget constraints are soft in the economy and the measure of bad
firms financed in the economy equals A – g*(γ ); when g*(γ ) ≥  A, budget constraints are hard and no bad firms are
                                                          
17 When the funding source chooses A ∈  [A, g(γ )], its payoff is Aα (q – w*(A)) since only good firms are financed.  Differentiate
this payoff function with respect to A, the first derivative is q – w(A) - Aw’(A).  Thus the payoff of the large funding source is
increasing in A.William Davidson Institute Working Paper Number 320
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financed; and when g*(γ ) = 0, market crashes.  Under centralized financing, soft budget constraint syndrome arises
when g(γ ) ∈  [γ , A).  And the reason behind the soft budget constraint syndrome is that under centralized financing, a
large funding source tries to internalize the pecuniary externality and may therefore find it worthwhile to extend
subsidized financing to bad firms to stabilize the economy.
[Figure 1 enters here]
Next, consider decentralized financing.  Under decentralized financing, each funding source finances a zero
measure of firms.  As a result, these funding sources will not internalize the externality and will therefore never
finance any loss-making firms.  Hence, when g(γ ) < A, no financing will take place since even good firms will be
losing money.   However, even when g(γ ) ≥  A, each funding source may still refuse to extend any financing if they
anticipate that other funding sources will not finance.  In other words, there may be coordination failure among
small funding sources under decentralized financing.  Figure 1– b summarizes the equilibrium outcomes of the
subgame at the financing stage for decentralized financing.
Proposition 1: In any subgame at the funding stage, budget constraints are softer under centralized financing than
under decentralized financing.
Proposition 1 suggests that a bad firm on the financial market is more likely to be financed under
centralized financing.  Nevertheless it does not imply that centralized financing is less efficient than decentralized
financing ex post (i.e., in a subgame at the funding stage).  In fact, it is easy to show that, given any g(γ ), centralized
financing is at least as efficient as decentralized financing, and that when soft budget constraint syndrome does arise,
the former is in fact more efficient than decentralized financing.
Nevertheless decentralized financing does help establish a credible commitment to hard budget constraints,
which may be lacking under centralized financing.  It has been argued extensively that lack of such a credible
commitment will compromise firms’ incentives to improve their performances (in this case, to engage in costly
restructuring).  In other words, centralized financing is believed to be less efficient than decentralized financing ex
ante despite the fact that it may be more efficient ex post.  Does the need for such a commitment make it sensible to
transform centralized financing to decentralized financing?  This is the issue I will address in the next section.William Davidson Institute Working Paper Number 320
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But before moving into that issue, I have to entertain a natural question as to whether centralized financing
can maintain hard budget constraints and at the same time internalize the pecuniary externality.  In particular,
instead of resorting to subsidized financing for loss-making firms, is it possible to use wage subsidies to maintain the
wage rate received by workers above the threshold level w?  The answer is not.  Because firms’ production
capacities are fixed, firms instead of workers will absorb all the wage subsidies.
18  As long as labor demand remains
the same, workers will receive the same wage rate.
Then how about a government expenditure program that expands the labor demand directly?  Such a
program is different from offering subsidized financing to loss-making firms.  Because firms use the labor for
production, they typically have better monitoring capability (a lower θ ) on the labor market as compared to other
parties (for example the government).  Accordingly, when additional labor demand is brought about through a
government expenditure program, the monitoring intensity on the labor market will become diluted.  It is then
straightforward to show that the threshold wage rate w will be increasing in the amount of additional demand
brought about through such a program.   As a result, a government expenditure program can be completely
ineffective in inducing workers to supply high skilled labor.
One key observation thus emerges.  While appearing to be subsidies for loss-making firms, soft budget
constraints are actually indirect subsidies for workers in order to induce them to invest in high skills.
19  Such
subsidies are needed because good firms do not generate enough labor demand.  These subsidies are administered
through subsidized financing for loss-making firms because only firms can better monitor workers’ skill on the labor
market.  In this sense, firms behave like “middlemen” in delivering subsidies to workers that produce high skilled
labor.
This observation is similar to a typical argument in the existing literature that soft budget constraints for a
firm are actually subsidies for its workers, either thanks to a paternalistic government (Kornai (1980)) or because of
politicians’ attempt to patronize their constituents (Shleifer and Vishny (1994)).  However, the existing literature has
not explained why subsidies are not delivered to workers directly.  My analysis makes the first attempt in
highlighting the difference between subsidizing labor and subsidizing firms that use the labor.
                                                          
18 Please refer to footnote 6 for a discussion why (good) firms’ production capacities are fixed when soft budget constraint
syndrome is present.William Davidson Institute Working Paper Number 320
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4.2.  Incentive Enhancing or Incentive Compromising
Let me now address the issue as to whether the need for a commitment to hard budget constraints makes it
sensible to transform centralized financing to decentralized financing.  To address the issue, I endogenize the
behavior of opportunistic firms and hence the measure of good firms on the financial market g(γ ).  To simplify my
analysis, I will focus on symmetric equilibrium: either no opportunistic firms restructure in which case g(γ ) = γ , or
all of the opportunistic firms restructure so that g(γ ) = γ  + ρ (1 - γ ).  Thus, the equilibrium measure of good firms
financed g*(γ ) ∈  {0, γ , γ  + ρ (1 - γ )}.
I begin my analysis with decentralized financing.  Under decentralized financing, because of the
commitment to hard budget constraints, every opportunistic firm will choose to restructure as long as financing takes
place in equilibrium (i.e., g*(γ ) > 0).  Hence g*(γ ) ∈  {0, γ  + ρ (1 - γ )}.
An equilibrium with g*(γ ) = 0 evidently exists for all γ .  An equilibrium with g*(γ ) = γ  + ρ (1 - γ ) exists if
and only if small funding sources choose to finance.  And small funding sources will finance if and only if they
anticipate the measure of good firms financed on the financial market A ≥  A (i.e., market is stable).  Thus, let γ h be
such that
γ h + ρ (1 - γ h) = A.
I have shown in the previous discussion that centralized financing can overcome, in a somewhat trivial way, the
problem of coordination failure among funding sources that exists under decentralized financing.  For a more
meaningful comparison between decentralized and centralized financing, I put aside this problem.  Accordingly, the
equilibrium outcomes under decentralized financing can be summarized as follows:
Lemma 1: Under decentralized financing, λ (γ ) = 0 for any γ ; and there exists
(1)  an equilibrium outcome with g*(γ ) = γ  + ρ (1 - γ ) when γ  ≥  γ h; and
(2)  an equilibrium outcome with g*(γ ) = 0 when γ  < A.
Using Lemma 1 as a benchmark for comparison, I now turn to the case of centralized financing.
                                                                                                                                                                                          
19 Notice that the demand on the input market is inelastic because of firms’ fixed production capacities, the supply on the input
market, however, is elastic.  Thus, the only way to subsidize inputs is to expand the input demand.William Davidson Institute Working Paper Number 320
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Under centralized financing, soft budget constraint syndrome may arise.  But does such soft budget constraint
syndrome compromise firms’ incentives as compared to decentralized financing?  The answer is no.  Instead:
Proposition 2: Decentralized financing compromises incentives to restructure as compared to centralized financing.
Proof: see Appendix.
The intuition behind Proposition 2 is rather straightforward.  Soft budget constraint syndrome arises under
centralized financing when the large funding source extends subsidized financing to make up weak demand in an
effort to keep the economy stable.  Without soft budget constraints, the economy is destabilized.  Once macro
stability is lost and the economy stumbles into a downward spiral, the disciplinary effect of hard budget constraints
evaporates and the opportunistic firms will surely not restructure.  It is therefore evident that decentralized financing
will never improve firms’ incentives as compared to centralized financing.
Instead, decentralized financing actually discourages firms to engage in due restructuring.  Setting aside the
coordination failure among funding sources as in Lemma 1, there are two additional reasons why decentralized
financing damages firms’ incentives as compared to centralized financing.
The first reason comes from the “coordination effect.”  Consider γ  < A but arbitrarily close to A. According
to Lemma 1, there exists an equilibrium g*(γ ) = 0 and an equilibrium g*(γ ) = γ  + ρ (1 - γ ) under decentralized
financing.   Such equilibrium multiplicity is a result of the externality of restructuring among the opportunistic firms.
When enough opportunistic firms choose to restructure, the economy becomes stabilized, in which case it is better
off for an opportunistic firm to restructure.  However, when there is not enough opportunistic firm restructuring, the
economy is destabilized and hence no opportunistic firm will restructure.   Accordingly, there is coordination failure
among firms under decentralized financing.
Centralized financing helps overcome such coordination failure.  While it is trivial that centralized
financing can eliminate coordination failure among funding sources, it is not so trivial why centralized financing can
help overcome coordination failure among firms existing under decentralized financing.  To understand this, notice
that, since γ  is arbitrarily close to A, the large funding source will surely offer subsidized financing to some bad
firms to stabilize the economy under centralized financing.  But since only a tiny proportion of bad firms is financed,
the budget constraints are almost hard.  Given the stabilized economy and the nearly hard budget constraints, it thusWilliam Davidson Institute Working Paper Number 320
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becomes a dominant strategy for every opportunistic firm to restructure regardless of what other opportunistic firms
do.
The second reason comes from the “stabilization effect.”  Consider γ  < γ h but arbitrarily close to γ h.  Under
decentralized financing, there is a unique equilibrium of g*(γ ) = 0 (see Lemma 1).  In this equilibrium, small funding
sources are unwilling to finance any firm because, even with all opportunistic firms restructuring, the measure of
good firms is not large enough to stabilize the economy.  Without financing from funding sources, the economy will
be destabilized and anticipating that, no opportunistic firm will restructure.  In contrast, under centralized financing,
the large funding source is surely willing to subsidize some loss-making firms when all opportunistic firms
restructure, given that γ  is arbitrarily close to γ h.  Its subsidized financing helps stabilize the economy.  But exactly
because γ  is arbitrarily close to γ h, only a tiny proportion of bad firms will be financed when all opportunistic firms
restructure.  Accordingly, a firm’s budget constraint is almost hard when all other opportunistic firms restructure.
Hence an opportunistic firm will have the incentive to restructure.
In other words, it is exactly the lack of a commitment to hard budget constraints under centralized
financing that brings the best out of the disciplinary effect of hard budget constraints.  With a credible commitment
to hard budget constraints, decentralized financing denies the possibility to make budget constraints soft enough, so
that macro stability can be maintained, and at the same time hard enough, so that firms will have incentives to
improve their performances.
By now it should be clear that, even taking into account the disciplinary effect of the commitment to hard
budget constraints, a transition from centralized financing to decentralized financing can be rather
counterproductive.   When macro stability is at stake, a transition to decentralized financing can destabilize the
economy through “credit crunch”, and as a result can discourages firms from embracing due reforms.
Proposition 3: Decentralized financing is less efficient than centralized financing.
Proof: See Appendix.
Proposition 3 is a result about a particular environment, where both macro stability and firms’
performances are at stake.  While the concern for macro stability calls for a centralized party to internalize the
pecuniary externality and stabilize the economy, the concern for firms’ performances calls for a mechanism toWilliam Davidson Institute Working Paper Number 320
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strengthen disciplines and enhance incentives.  Proposition 3 suggests that, in such an environment, a transition to
decentralized financing from centralized financing is counterproductive, despite the fact that decentralized financing
brings a credible commitment to hard budget constraints, while centralized financing may lead to soft budget
constraints.
5. From Centralized Financing to the Dual Track System
While the transition from centralized financing to decentralized financing is counterproductive, a transition
from centralized financing to a dual track system can be efficiency enhancing.  Under a dual track system, the
economy is divided into two sectors or two tracks: a centralized one and a decentralized one.  In the centralized
track, a large funding source finances a group of firms, while the rest of firms in the economy are financed in the
decentralized track by a continuum of small funding sources.
As it will turn out, the performance of a dual track system depends on how firms are allocated across these
two tracks.  Therefore I begin my analysis by defining the allocation of firms.  A dual track system allocates some of
the firms to the decentralized track and others to the centralized track before restructuring takes place.  My interest is
not so much about how such an allocation takes place, rather it is about whether there is a set of allocations such that
a dual track system is more efficient than centralized financing.
To simplify my analysis, I assume that only the information of whether a firm is good or bad is used in
determining an allocation, presumably because whether a firm is opportunistic is unknown to anyone but the firm
itself.  Accordingly, an allocation is characterized by the measures of firms in centralized track and the share of good
firms among these firms.  Furthermore, I allow the allocation to be contingent on the initial condition of the
economy, i.e., the measure of good firms the economy is endowed with.   Let kc denote the first measure and γ c
denote the second measure.  An allocation is then summarized by {kc(γ ), γ c(γ )}.  By definition, γ c(γ ) ≤  min{kc(γ ), γ }
and kc(γ ) - γ c(γ ) ≤  1 - γ .
Thus defined, it is evident that centralized financing and decentralized financing are nothing but
degenerated forms of a dual track system.  In particular, when kc(γ ) = 1 and hence γ c(γ ) = γ , the resulting dual track
system is centralized financing.  Similarly, when kc(γ ) = 0 and hence γ c(γ ) = 0, the resulting dual track system is
decentralized financing.  This observation thus implies that a dual track system can always be at least as efficient as
centralized financing.  However, this trivial observation is not what my analysis is intended for.  What I amWilliam Davidson Institute Working Paper Number 320
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interested in is whether a dual track system can actually be more efficient than centralized financing.  In other
words, I want to know whether for some γ , there exists an allocation {kc(γ ), γ c(γ )} with kc(γ ) ∈  (0, 1) such that a dual
track system is strictly more efficient than centralized financing for an economy E(γ ).
5.1. What a Dual Track System Cannot Do
Recall that there are two potential problems in an economy studied in this paper.  One is macro instability,
which is highlighted by the equilibrium of market crash (g*(γ ) = 0).  The other problem is that the effort to stabilize
the economy compromises firms’ incentives to restructure because in equilibrium budget constraints are too soft.
The second problem is highlighted by the equilibrium where not only some bad firms are financed but also no
opportunistic firms choose to restructure as a result (g*(γ ) = γ  such that γ  < A).
Definition 6 (Incentive Compromising Soft Budget Constraint Syndrome): Soft budget constraint syndrome is said
to be incentive compromising for an economy E(γ ) if and only if there exists the equilibrium g*(γ ) = γ  for that
economy such that γ  < A.
A dual track system could improve upon centralized financing through these two dimensions: stabilizing
the economy and enhancing incentives by hardening budget constraints.  However, it turns out that a dual track
system can never improve upon centralized financing by stabilizing the economy.  In other words,
Proposition 4: A dual track system cannot improve on centralized financing by stabilizing the economy.  That is, if
g*(γ ) = 0 is an equilibrium under centralized financing, it must remain as an equilibrium under a dual track system.
The intuition is as follows.  When g*(γ ) = 0 is an equilibrium under centralized financing, a dual track
system could be more efficient than centralized financing only if, according to the “comparative efficiency
criterion,” g*(γ ) is not an equilibrium under a dual track system, which is unfortunately impossible.
To see this, suppose g*(γ ) = 0 is one of the equilibria under centralized financing.  This implies that either
the large funding source is unwilling to finance when there is no restructuring, i.e., g(γ ) = γ ; or the large fundingWilliam Davidson Institute Working Paper Number 320
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source refuses to finance even when all opportunistic firms have restructured, i.e., g(γ ) = γ  + ρ (1 - γ ).  Consider the
first case.  If, given that there is no restructuring in both tracks, the large funding source is unwilling to finance
under centralized financing, it must continue to be unwilling to finance under a dual track system, regardless of what
small funding sources will do.  And if the large funding source is unwilling to finance in the centralized track, there
must be no reason for small funding sources to finance in the decentralized track.  Hence g*(γ ) = 0 is an equilibrium
under a dual track system.  Now let’s consider the second case.   If the large funding source refuses to finance even
when all opportunistic firms have restructured under centralized financing, it obviously will not finance under a dual
track system regardless of what small funding sources will do.  Hence, for the same reason, g*(γ ) = 0 will be an
equilibrium under a dual track system.
The corollary of Proposition 4 is that a dual track system can improve upon centralized financing only if
soft budget constraint syndrome is incentive compromising.  Accordingly, I introduce the next observation.  Let µ  =
α (q – w)/w and let ν  = [(1 - α )(q – w) – d]/B.
Assumption 4: A/(1 + µ ) ≥  (A - ν )/(1 - ν ).
Lemma 2: Suppose Assumption 4 holds.  Then under centralized financing, there exists an equilibrium where soft
budget constraint syndrome is incentive compromising (i.e., g*(γ ) = γ ) if and only if the following condition holds:
A/(1 + µ ) ≤  γ  < (A - ν )/(1 - ν ).
Proof: see Appendix.
5.2.  When a Dual Track System Can Do Better
Now consider the case where soft budget constraint syndrome may compromise firms’ incentives under
centralized financing (i.e, Assumption 4 holds).  I will first characterize the equilibrium outcomes under centralized
financing.  I will then examine whether for some economies there exist some allocations so that a dual track system
will be more efficient than centralized financing.
Define γ 1 as such that
γ 1 + ρ (1 - γ 1) = (A - ν )/(1 - ν ).William Davidson Institute Working Paper Number 320
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And define γ 2 as such that
γ 2 = (A - ν )/(1 - ν ).
It is straightforward to show that, anticipating g(γ ) = γ  + ρ (1 - γ ), an opportunistic firm will restructure if and only if
γ  ≥  γ 1; and that an opportunistic firm will restructure while anticipating g(γ ) = γ  if and only if γ  ≥  γ 2.
Lemma 3: Suppose Assumption 4 holds.  Then under centralized financing, there exists
(1)  an equilibrium with g*(γ ) = γ  + ρ (1 - γ ) if γ  ≥  γ 1;
(2)  an equilibrium with g*(γ ) = γ  if γ  ∈  [γ , γ 2]
 20;  and
(3)  an equilibrium with g*(γ ) = 0 if γ  < γ .
Lemma 3 is highlighted in Figure 2.  The left panel of Figure 2 describes a case when γ 1 < γ  and the right
panel shows otherwise.  In this figure, the bold line represents g*(γ ), the measure of good firms financed in
equilibrium.  The thin line located at A indicates the total measure of firms financed when soft budget constraint
syndrome exists.  Soft budget constraint syndrome compromises firms’ incentives to restructure when g*(γ ) is on the
45 degree line (i.e., g*(γ ) = γ ).  As suggested in the last section, soft budget constraint syndrome does not always
compromise incentives.  In fact, Figure 2 demonstrates that soft budget constraint syndrome can be quite consistent
with a situation where every opportunistic firm chooses to restructure.
[Figure 2 enters here]
Let’s now turn to the dual track system.   With the aid of Figure 2, it becomes evident that a dual track
system can never be more efficient than centralized financing for γ  ≥  γ 2.  Following Proposition 4, it is evident that a
dual track system cannot be more efficient than centralized financing for γ  < γ  either.  My attention is therefore led
to γ  ∈  [γ , γ 2), i.e. to those economies suffering from a soft budget constraint syndrome that is incentive
compromising.  Some preliminary observations are in order.
First, in an equilibrium where the large funding source finances in the centralized track, restructuring must
take place for every opportunistic firm in the decentralized track, and as a result financing must take place in the
decentralized track.
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Lemma 4: In any equilibrium where the large funding source finances in the centralized track, financing and
restructuring take place in the decentralized track.
The intuition is clear.  Financing takes place in the centralized track only if high skilled labor are supplied
on the input market.  Hence, if financing takes place in the centralized track in equilibrium, small funding sources
will finance a firm in the decentralized track if and only if it is a good firm.  As a result, every opportunistic firm in
the decentralized track will transform itself into a good firm through restructuring.
The next observation is the natural implication of Lemma 4.
Lemma 5: For an economy E(γ ) such that γ  > γ , financing always takes place in both centralized track and
decentralized track and restructuring always takes place in the decentralized track, provided that kc(γ ) ∈  [A, 1) and
γ c(γ ) ≥  γ .
The intuition is again straightforward.  For an economy E(γ ) such that γ  > γ , an allocation with kc(γ ) ∈  [A,
1) and γ c(γ ) ≥  γ  is feasible (since γ  < A).  Given that kc(γ ) ∈  [A, 1), there are enough firms in the centralized track for
the large funding source to stabilize the economy.  And given that γ c(γ ) ≥  γ , the large funding source is willing to
stabilize the economy by financing in the centralized track, even when no opportunistic firm restructures (see
Lemma 3).  As a result, the economy is always stabilized.  The rest then follows immediately from Lemma 4.
Lemma 5 demonstrates one of the central observations of this paper.  That is, under a dual track system,
provided that the large funding in the centralized track is both capable and willing to stabilize the economy, the
decentralized track will no longer be plagued by problems that besiege decentralized financing.  Lemma 5 highlights
the significance of the centralized track to the performances of firms within the decentralized track.  By helping
stabilize the economy, the centralized track enhances the disciplinary effect of the commitment to hard budget
constraints in the decentralized track and therefore promotes better performances of firms within that track.
Nevertheless, it is not true that, for an economy E(γ ) such that γ  > γ , any allocation such that kc(γ ) ∈  [A, 1)
and γ c(γ ) ≥  γ  will necessarily make a dual track system more efficient than centralized financing.  For some γ  ∈  [γ ,
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γ 2), there exists an equilibrium g*(γ ) = γ  + ρ (1 - γ ) (see Figure 2).  Naturally, a dual track system is more efficient
than centralized financing only when this equilibrium is preserved under the dual track system.  Similarly, there does
not exist an equilibrium g*(γ ) = 0 for any γ  ∈  [γ , γ 2) under centralized financing.  A dual track system is more
efficient than centralized financing only when such an equilibrium does not exist under the dual track system either.
For these reasons, I lay out some restrictions on an allocation {kc(γ ), γ c(γ )}.  The first restriction is that, if
the economy has an equilibrium g*(γ )  = γ  + ρ (1 – γ ) under centralized financing, the allocation {kc(γ ), γ c(γ )} must
allow such an equilibrium to continue to exist under the dual track system.  In particular, suppose an economy E(γ )
choose an allocation {kc, γ c} for its dual track system.  With such an allocation, an opportunistic firm will restructure
(while anticipating restructuring to take place in both centralized track and decentralized track and financing to take
place in the economy) if and only if
    [A – γ  - ρ (1 – γ )]/[(1 - ρ )(kc - γ c)] ≤  ν .[ 1 ]
And given that restructuring takes place in both tracks, the large funding source will finance, either when the
economy is stable (i.e., γ  + (1 – γ )ρ  ≥  A) or when it can profit from stabilizing the economy:
[A – γ  - ρ (1 – γ )]/[γ c + ρ (kc - γ c)] ≤  µ .[ 2 ]
Lemma 6: A dual track system is more efficient than centralized financing only if {kc(γ ),γ c(γ )} satisfies condition [1]
and [2] for any γ  > γ 1.
The second restriction that has to be imposed is that the large funding source must be able and be willing to
stabilize the economy.  It is straightforward to verify that the equilibrium g*(γ )  = 0 will exist under a dual track
system for γ  ≥  γ  if and only if kc(γ ) < A or if γ c(γ ) < γ .  Hence:
Lemma 7: A dual track system is more efficient than centralized financing only if kc(γ ) ≥  A and γ c(γ ) ≥  γ  for γ  ≥  γ .
With all these preliminary observations, the next conclusion then comes handy:William Davidson Institute Working Paper Number 320
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Proposition 5: There exists a dual track system that is more efficient than centralized financing if and only if an
economy suffers from soft budget constraint syndrome that compromises firms’ incentives to engage in costly
restructuring, i.e., if and only if γ  ∈  [γ , γ 2).
Proof: see Appendix.
The intuition behind Proposition 5 can be explained simply.  For γ  ∈  [γ , γ 2), there exists an equilibrium
g*(γ ) = γ  and possibly an equilibrium g*(γ ) = γ  + ρ (1- γ ) under centralized financing.  A dual track system can
improve efficiency as compared to centralized financing if and only if it maintains the equilibrium g*(γ ) = γ  + ρ (1-
γ ) if it exists under centralized financing and replaces the equilibrium g*(γ ) = γ  with an equilibrium g*(γ ) > γ , while
at the same time not creating an equilibrium g*(γ ) = 0.
Suppose that the equilibrium g*(γ ) = γ  + ρ (1- γ ) does not exist under centralized financing.  Then a dual
track system that spins off only bad firms to the decentralized track while keeping at least A measure of firms
(among those, at least γ  measure of good firms) in the centralized track must dominate centralized financing
(Lemma 5).
Suppose that the equilibrium g*(γ ) = γ  + ρ (1- γ ) does exist under centralized financing.  In such an
equilibrium, both the incentive compatibility condition for an opportunistic firm to restructure and the participation
constraint for the large funding source to finance are not binding provided that γ  > γ 1.  Therefore, it is always
feasible (for γ  > max{γ 1, γ }) to spin off some bad firms to the decentralized track without affecting either of these
two constraints, while at the same time keeping at least A measure of firms (among those, at least γ  measure of good
firms) in the centralized track.  As a result, the equilibrium g*(γ ) = γ  + ρ (1- γ ) will continue to exist whereas the
equilibrium g*(γ ) = γ  under centralized financing will be replaced by an equilibrium g*(γ ) ∈  (γ , γ  + ρ (1- γ )] under
the dual track system.
 The key insight behind Proposition 5 is that centralized financing has its dilemma and a dual track system
can overcome this dilemma.  While centralized financing can stabilize the economy, such stabilization may come at
the cost of soft budget constraints compromising firms’ incentives to improve their performances.  By splitting the
economy into two tracks, a dual track system can rely on the centralized track to stabilize the economy, and depend
on the decentralized track to build a commitment to hard budget constraints.  As the economy is stabilized, theWilliam Davidson Institute Working Paper Number 320
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disciplinary effect of the commitment within the decentralized track then provides powerful incentives for firms to
engage in costly restructuring.
A natural question is whether such a dual track system can be mimicked under centralized financing.   One
central feature of a dual track system is the “discriminatory” funding practices faced by bad firms in the two tracks.
In the decentralized track, a bad firm is never financed; whereas in the centralized track, a bad firm may be financed.
Had the large funding source been able to commit to targeting subsidized financing to some bad firms in particular
(and as a result other bad firms are never financed), centralized financing could mimic the dual track system, as it
would promote incentives to restructure for those opportunistic firms not targeted.  However, the large funding
source may not be able to adhere to such a commitment, especially when the productivity of different bad firms
differs at the funding stage.
21
5.3. The Extent and the Distribution of Efficiency Gains
We now know that a transition from centralized financing to a dual track system can be efficiency
enhancing for an economy suffering from a soft budget constraint syndrome that compromises firms’ incentives.
What we don’t know yet is what is the extent of the efficiency gain and how the efficiency gain is distributed across
the centralized track and decentralized track.
To address these questions, I compare centralized financing with a dual track system of the optimal
allocation for γ  ∈  [γ , γ 2).  Naturally, my comparison will focus exclusively on two distinct equilibrium outcomes
under these two financial structures, that is, the “low” equilibrium under the dual track system g*(γ ) ∈  (γ , γ  + ρ (1-
γ ))]
22 and the “low” equilibrium under centralized financing (i.e, g*(γ ) = γ ).
                                                          
21 For example, suppose the productivity of a bad firm is a random variable, which is distributed independently across all firms
and is not realized until the funding stage.  Then under centralized financing, the large funding source will not be able to commit
to targeting a particular set of bad firms.   For the sake of expositional simplicity, I would not model suck a lack of commitment
explicitly.
22 Notice that I has not yet ruled out the possibility that, under a dual track system, there exists a unique equilibrium g*(γ ) = γ  +
ρ (1- γ ) in which case the “low” equilibrium will be the same as “high” equilibrium.  However, as I will show later, such a
possibility does not exist and in the “low” equilibrium g*(γ ) ∈  (γ , γ  + ρ (1- γ )).William Davidson Institute Working Paper Number 320
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Let me first characterize the optimal allocation for the dual track system.  An allocation {kc(γ ),γ cx(γ )} is
said to be optimal if there does not exist another allocation {kcz(γ ),γ cz(γ )} such that the allocation {kcz(γ ),γ cz(γ )} is
more efficient than the allocation {kcx(γ ),γ cx(γ )}.
23
Lemma 8: An allocation {kc*(γ ), γ c*(γ )} for γ  ∈  [γ , γ 2) is optimal if and only if
(1)  kc*(γ ) ≥  A, γ c*(γ ) ≥  γ ;
(2)  {kc*(γ ), γ c*(γ )} satisfies condition [1] and [2] if the equilibrium g*(γ ) = γ  + ρ (1- γ )] exists under centralized
financing; and
(3)  kc*(γ ) - γ c*(γ ) = min{kc(γ ) - γ c(γ )}
Proof: see Appendix.
The first two parts in Lemma 8 are obvious from earlier discussions.  To make sense of the last part, notice
that, under a dual track system, budget constraints are always harder in the decentralized track than in centralized
track.  Ceteris paribus, it is therefore optimal to allocate as many as possible firms whose performances can be
potentially improved under hard budget constraints (i.e, opportunistic firms) to the decentralized track.  Since the
measure of opportunistic firms in the decentralized track is ρ [1 – γ  - (kc(γ ) - γ c(γ ))],
24 an optimal allocation therefore
requires kc(γ ) - γ c(γ ) to be minimized (subject to (1) and (2)).
25
I am now ready to dissect the impact of a transition from centralized financing to a dual track system with
the optimal allocation.  Under centralized financing, there is only one track in an economy: the centralized track.  In
that track, no firms restructure in the equilibrium g*(γ ) = γ  and the corresponding softness of budget constraints is
λ (γ ) = (A - γ )/(1 - γ ).
The transition takes the economy to the dual track system where the equilibrium g*(γ ) = γ  is replaced by the
equilibrium g*(γ ) ≥  γ  + ρ [1 – γ  - (kc*(γ ) - γ c*(γ ))].  That is, the restructuring takes place at least in the decentralized
track under the dual track system.  But will restructuring even take place in the centralized track in this equilibrium?
                                                          
23 The notion of an allocation {kcx(γ ),γ cx(γ )} being more efficient than another allocation {kcz(γ ),γ cz(γ )} is the same as the notion
of one financial structure X being more efficient than another financing structure Z (see section 3).
24 Recall that the allocation is contingent on whether a firm is good or bad (before restructuring).
25 I show in the proof of Lemma 9 that minimizing kc(γ )-γ c(γ ) does not affect firms’ behaviors in the centralized track.William Davidson Institute Working Paper Number 320
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In other words, will g*(γ ) = γ  + ρ (1 – γ ) be the unique equilibrium under the dual track system? Unfortunately, it
won’t, as the next observation shows.
Lemma 9: For γ  ∈  [γ , γ 2), there exists an equilibrium where g*(γ ) = γ  + ρ [1 – γ  - (kc*(γ ) - γ c*(γ ))] and λ (γ ) = [A –
g*(γ )]/[kc*(γ ) - γ c*(γ )] under the optimal dual track system {kc*(γ ), γ c*(γ )}.
Proof: see Appendix.
Lemma 9 highlights the extent of the efficiency gain that a dual track system brings over centralized
financing.  It hinges on the observation that, for γ  ∈  [γ , γ 2), budget constraints in the centralized are always softer
under a dual track system than under centralized financing, despite the fact that restructuring is taking place in the
decentralized track under a dual track system.
Restructuring taking place in the decentralized track has two countervailing effects on the softness of
budget constraints.  On the one hand, restructuring in the decentralized track reduces the measure of bad firms that
the large funding source has to finance in order to stabilize the economy.  Thus restructuring in the decentralized
track has an effect of hardening budget constraints in the centralized track.  But on the other hand, the large funding
source finances bad firms only within the centralized track.  As the dual track system spins off some bad firms to the
decentralized track, the large funding source also has fewer bad firms to finance.  As a result, restructuring in the
decentralized track also leads to an effect of softening budget constraints in the centralized track.  As it turns out, the
budget-softening effect always dominates the budget-hardening effect.
Combining Proposition 5 and Lemma 9, I arrive at the final conclusion that summarizes the distribution of
the efficiency gain under the optimal dual track system {kc*(γ ), γ c*(γ )}:
Proposition 6: Consider an economy that suffers from a soft budget constraint syndrome that compromises firms’
incentives to engage in costly restructuring.  A transition to the optimal dual track system has the following effects:
(1)  restructuring takes place in the decentralized track (i.e., g*(γ ) > γ );
(2)  budget constraints become softer in the centralized track (i.e, λ (γ ) > (A – γ )/(1 - γ ) > 0); and
(3)  the economy reaches an equilibrium that is more efficient.William Davidson Institute Working Paper Number 320
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According to Proposition 6, a dual track system is only a half-way reform measure.  It allows the
centralized track to delay due restructuring by softening budget constraints in that part of the economy.
Nevertheless, the soft budget constraint syndrome in the centralized track complements restructuring in the
decentralized track, in the sense that it helps stabilize the economy and hence enhances the disciplinary effect of
hard budget constraints in the decentralized track.
6. Interpreting China’s Dual Track System
Let me now relate my analysis to China’s economic reform.  There are two defining characteristics of
China’s economic reform.  One is the fast and forceful expansion of the non-state sector.  Its share in China’s total
industrial output has increased from a mere 24 percent in 1980 to more than 75 percent in 1997.  The other defining
characteristics is the gradual and piecemeal approach toward its state industry and banking sector.  There has been
no massive privatization of state-owned enterprises during the last two decades of economic reform, and China’s
banking sector has continued to be dominated by four major state-owned commercial banks.
26
While the economic reform over the past twenty years has brought China an average real GNP growth rate
of 10.4 percent, the financial performance of China’s state-owned enterprises has deteriorated over recent years
despite on-going enterprise reform.  In 1985, the amount of losses made by state-owned industrial enterprises was
about 3.2 billion and the total profits of these enterprises was around 70 billion.  By 1997, the loss rose to more than
80 billion while at the same time the total profits dropped to about 40 billion.
Many of the financial losses have been covered by the state-dominated banking system, which has helped
keep chronic loss-making state firms alive.  As a result, the state banking system has accumulated a considerable
amount of non-performing loans over the years.  The total non-performing loans were estimated in the range of 17-
25 percent of GDP by 1993 (Lau and Qian (1994)), increasing to 25-35 percent by 1997 (Lardy (1998)).
On the other hand, non-state enterprises have been allocated with a disproportionately low amount of credit
from the state banking system (Fan 1999).  It is estimated that between 1979-1993, on average 84 percent of all new
credits from the state banking system were allocated to the state sector (Brandt and Zhou (1999)).  And between
1994 – 19997, non-state sector obtained less than 14 percent of short term loans from the state banking system
                                                          
26 They account for nearly three-fourths of total bank assets (Bonin etc (1999)).William Davidson Institute Working Paper Number 320
30
despite the fact that during the same period of time, non-state sector has contributed more than 65 percent of the
growth of China’s industrial output (Bai, etc (1999)).
Without the financial support from the state banking system, the non-state sector has depended heavily on
funds internally accumulated and funds that are raised from local economies.  Even when firms in the non-state
sector do receive funds leaked from the state banking system, those funds are often allocated under a profit-seeking
objective.  They are therefore quite different from funds formally allocated through the state banking system, which
until 1995 were administered through the state’s annual credit plans.
27  As a result, budget constraints in the non-
state sector are much harder than in the state sector (Qian and Roland (1998), Cao, Qian, and Weingast (1999)).
Putting these experiences in the framework of foregoing analysis, it is clear that China’s economy has
evolved in a dual track system, with the state sector remaining in the track of centralized financing and the non-state
sector in the track of decentralized financing.  While budget constraints are soft in the centralized track, they are
hard(er) in the decentralized track.  But why dual track?  In particular, why didn’t China harden budget constraints
of state-owned enterprises and eliminate the state dominance in the banking sector at the onset of economic reforms?
China does not have effective monetary policy instruments because of underdeveloped financial markets.
Neither does China have good fiscal policy instruments due to the lack of well-established tax system and recent
fiscal decentralization that has limited the central government’s fiscal resources.  By maintaining the state
dominance in the banking sector and a considerable share of state-owned firms in the economy, the central
government in China is able to preserve its control of macro economic conditions.
More importantly, the central government often has no choice but to subsidize some of the loss making
state-owned enterprises in order to safeguard China’s macro economic conditions.  This is because that the
worsening financial performance of these enterprises often has to do with historical reasons.  One of the reasons is
the enterprise-based social welfare system that requires a state-owned enterprise to pay for numerous non-labor
expenses ranging from health care and housing to schooling and childcare.
28 In particular, state-owned enterprises
often bear a disproportionately large financial burden on pension expenses as compared to firms in the non-state
                                                          
27 As the reform progresses, China has sought to inject market disciplines to the banking sector.  Three policy banks were
established in 1994 to separate policy lending from commercial lending.  In practice, however, commercial banks have continued
to lend according to government directives.  Recently, the state has consistently mandated commercial banks to continue lending
to accommodate its policies of supporting large- and medium-sized state enterprises (Bonin etc (1999))
28 According to a 1994 World Bank survey of 37 state-owned enterprises, social spending accounted for 76 percent of total labor
costs, which included health care (15 percent), pension (22 percent) and housing (37 percent) (World Bank (1996)).William Davidson Institute Working Paper Number 320
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sector.
29 Another fact has to do with the resource allocation during the central planning period when industries that
may not be sustainable in a market system were promoted due to strategic concerns (Lin etc (1996), Lin and Tan
(1999), Sachs (1996)).  In fact, because of price distortion, it was often impossible for the state to determine whether
an enterprise was economically viable or not under central planning.  These historical burdens take tolls on many of
the enterprises regardless of whether budget constraints are hard or soft and as a result, hard budget constraints will
have little disciplinary effect on these enterprises (i.e., the “genuinely” bad firms in this model).
Nevertheless, allocative inefficiency alone cannot explain why the central government has resorted to
subsidized financing to keep some of the loss-making state-owned firms alive.  Hard budget constraints can serve
both as a disciplinary device and as an attrition mechanism.  Even when a hard budget constraint cannot promote
incentives to restructure, it can still help weed out inefficient firms.
The magnitude of allocative inefficiency matters.  While it is impossible to disentangle what losses are due
to allocative inefficiency and what are due to incentives, one could nonetheless get a rough picture of this magnitude
simply by considering the size of so-called “redundant workers,” i.e., workers that are regarded as unproductive.
According to World Bank and China’s State Economic and Trade Commission, the redundant workers account for
15 to 20 percent of employees in the state sector (World Bank (1996)), which is equivalent to about 15 million
workers.  This implies that an all-out effort to harden budget constraints will put at least 10 percent of the urban
labor force out of jobs,
30 not to mention some domino effects such an effort could lead to.  Thus, given the colossal
magnitude of allocative inefficiency, the central government perhaps has little choice (at least for a period of time)
but to provide some state firms subsidized financing in an effort to stabilize the macro economic conditions.
Using a standard economic argument, this paper has introduced a particular channel (i.e., skill adoption)
through which hard budget constraints can adversely affect macro stability.  However, this is by no means the only
channel.  It is easy to imagine other channels through which hard budget constraints can destabilize an economy.  In
the introduction, I have mentioned the possibility of political unrest, demand spill over.  One can add on to the list.
For example, the role of contracts will be diminished when it is anticipated that many firms will disappear from the
economic scene.  The role of reputation and cooperation will become insignificant when the horizon of many firms
                                                          
29 In 1994, the employee-retiree ratio was 4.8 for state-owned enterprises and 12.5 for firms in the non-state sector (State
Statistical Bureau and Ministry of Labor (1996)).
30 This does not include urban workers that are currently unemployed and surplus labor in China’s rural areas.William Davidson Institute Working Paper Number 320
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gets shortened and the scope of long-term relations is reduced.  And when only “few good guys” are left in an
economy, there will be less competition.
However, maintaining the state sector has not only allowed China to escape from the devastating
experiences of macro instability of Eastern European countries and Russia, it has also provided an environment
conducive to the rapid expansion of the non-state sector.
  While potentially rewarding, empirically establishing the
linkage between macro stability and the non-state sector growth as well as the relation between maintaining the state
sector and macro stability in the case of China is difficult.
31  I will therefore refrain myself from venturing into this
territory except for pointing to the dismal experience on the other side of the picture: the dramatic output fall and the
subsequent stagnation in many of the decentralized transition economies, as in the Introduction.  Although it is
evident that there is a conscious effort by the central government to stabilize the economy, it is perhaps an
unintended consequence that such an effort helps the growth of the non-state sector.  In fact, in the foregoing
analysis, I have assumed that the large funding source in the centralized track does not share revenues with firms in
the decentralized track.  This assumption corresponds to the fact that the central government in China has found it
difficult to collect taxes from the non-state sector.
It is worth reiterating, however, that a dual track approach has its costs.  As suggested earlier, by allowing
budget constraints to be soft in the state sector, the dual track approach has to some extent let some of the state firms
delay due restructuring.  Thus the side effects of the dual track approach are the chronic loss making of many state
firms and the accumulated non-performing loans in the state banking system as suggested earlier.
32  These side
effects deem the dual track approach a transitory reform measure.
Nevertheless, further reforms call for measures more than simply hardening budget constraints.  It takes the
growth of the non-state sector (i.e., the decentralized track) to diminish the share of bad firms in the economy and
hence the destabilizing effect of hardening budget constraints (McMillan and Naughton (1992)).   It takes various
fundamental reforms to revitalize those bad firms that are otherwise doomed to fail.  However, because the growth
of the non-state sector and the various fundamental reforms must take time to exert their impacts, the dual track
                                                          
31 One of the obvious difficulties is that China has been undergoing economic transition for only about twenty years. This limits
the number of observations and hence the control variables one can incorporate in any econometric model.  The other challenge
is exactly that during those twenty years, China did not experience macro instability, like the one experienced in Eastern
European economies and former Soviet Union.
32 A recent work by Brandt and Zhou (1999) argues that the state’s commitment to state sector employment has created a “stop
and go” economic fluctuation in China.  However, they didn’t endogenize the reason for such a commitment.William Davidson Institute Working Paper Number 320
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approach becomes an attractive transitory reform measure, and an all-out effort to harden budget constraints
becomes counterproductive.
There have not been many studies on China’s dual track approach in economic reforms.  Li (1999) shows
that the dual track approach in price liberalization, which allows firms to produce for the emerging product markets
after fulfilling output quotas under planning, helps China avoid output fall at the initial stage of economic reforms.
Lau, Qian, and Roland (1999) push the concept of the dual track approach beyond price liberalization.  They argue
that, by providing both the option of remaining in the planned sector and that of joining the emerging markets, the
dual track approach has made the economic reform in China a Pareto improvement.  This paper complements these
two works by suggesting how the dual track approach has actually contributed to the growth of the non-state sector.
A number of authors have also emphasized the contribution of the state sector to the development of the
non-state sector during China’s dual track reform, albeit in a micro economic context.  The main argument is that the
non-state sector has benefited from the state sector through the provision of inputs, technology, market outlets, and
outsourcing (see Jefferson and Rawski (1994), Naughton (1994), and Lian and Wei (1993)).  However, there has
been little discussion concerning whether and how the presence of the state sector has helped the growth of China’s
non-state sector from a macro economic perspective.  This paper serves to fill the vacuum.
7. Conclusion
This paper puts forward a new framework for understanding soft budget constraint syndrome.  It
emphasizes externality and macro stability in particular as one of the major reasons for the syndrome.  It differs
from the mainstream framework in the existing literature, à la Dewatripont and Maskin (1995).
33
This framework uses the original concept of soft budget constraint syndrome, defined as a situation when
firms that are expected to lose money get financed (Kornai (1980))
34.  The concept adopted in the mainstream
framework refers to a situation where refinancing financially distressed and yet potentially profitable firms invites
loss making in the first place.  I deviate from the mainstream concept not because the mainstream concept is
                                                          
33 Following the tradition of Dewatripont and Maskin (1995), most of works in the soft budget constraint literature model soft
budget constraint syndrome as a time-inconsistency problem, where refinancing is ex post efficient but ex ante inefficient.
Lindbeck and Weibull (1988) made an early attempt to model soft budget constraints as such a problem.  This theoretical
framework is by no means the only one existing in the soft budget constraint literature but is certainly one that is most widely
used.  Some exceptions include Goldfeld and Quandt (1988), Segal (1998) and Shleifer and Vishny (1994).William Davidson Institute Working Paper Number 320
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“wrong.”  In fact, the mainstream concept captures important economic phenomena that are beyond the scope of this
paper.
35  I adopt the original concept for two reasons.
First, the mainstream concept is difficult to be measured statistically.  According to the mainstream
concept, budget constraints are soft when refinancing invites loss making and becomes inefficient ex ante.
Therefore, the concept is based not only on a causal relationship between loss making and refinancing but also on an
efficiency implication of refinancing.
36  Neither is directly observable.  Because of such a difficulty in measurement,
few empirical studies have executed this concept appropriately.
37  For how soft budget constraints may be measured
using the original concept, one may refer to the work by Schaffer (1998).
Second, the original concept is more consistent with a central feature of soft budget syndrome in transition
economies: firms in chronic losses are kept alive; and is also more compatible with how soft budget constraint
syndrome is described in policy-related discussions.  This central feature of chronic loss making suggests that one
should look outside a firm for reasons behind soft budget constraint syndrome.  This is why this new framework
focuses on externality and macro stability in particular.  In contrast, the mainstream framework emphasizes dynamic
concerns inside a firm: the firm is temporarily financial distressed but will be profitable once refinanced.    
But does it matter whether budget constraints are soft because of externality reasons outside a firm or due
to dynamic concern inside a firm?  It is contended that, as long as budget constraints are soft, firms’ incentives to
improve their performances will be compromised.
38  As a result, the mainstream framework devotes little effort to
exploring and differentiating various reasons behind soft budget constraints.  This paper demonstrates that reasons
for soft budget constraints do matter.  It shows that, when budget constraints are soft because of concerns for macro
stability, a commitment to hard budget constraints can be neither necessary nor sufficient for encouraging firms to
improve their performances.
                                                                                                                                                                                          
34 In Kornai’s analysis, the reason for the soft budget constraint syndrome is “paternalism” by the state.  This analysis attributes
the reason to pecuniary externality such as macro stability.
35 Indeed, many important contributions, including the seminal work by Dewatripont and Maskin (1995), have been made under
the mainstream framework.  See for example, Berglof and Roland (1995, 1997, 1998), Huang and Xu (1999), Li (1999), Qian
(1994), Qian and Roland (1998), and Schmidt (1996).
36 It is well known in the corporate finance literature that refinancing can also promote incentives and be ex ante efficiency
enhancing (see Neher (1999) and von Thadden (1995) for example).
37 Some recent empirical works would simply equate losses as a measure of soft budget constraints while applying this
mainstream concept of soft budget constraints.
38 See Maskin and Xu (1999) for example.William Davidson Institute Working Paper Number 320
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Such a difference originates from the fact that the mainstream framework stresses a conflict between ex
post allocative efficiency and ex ante incentives, whereas this framework emphasizes both the conflict as well as a
complementary relationship.  In particular, in this framework, (ex post) allocative efficiency calls for internalizing
externality, which softens budget constraints on the one hand but on the other hand enhances firms’ productivity and
can therefore improve their ex ante incentives to restructure.  Because of this difference, the mainstream framework
sometimes sees efforts aimed at improving allocative efficiency as potentially incentive compromising.  On the
contrary, this framework regards these efforts as a part of the reform measures that may ultimately help transition
economies eliminate the soft budget constraint syndrome.William Davidson Institute Working Paper Number 320
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 2:
The proof is based on the definition of “better incentives”.  It is divided into four parts.  The first two parts
show that decentralized financing never improves incentives as compared to centralized financing.  The last two
parts demonstrate that decentralized financing actually hurts incentives in comparison with centralized financing.
(1)  γ  ≥  A.  It is evident that there exists a unique equilibrium where every opportunistic firm restructures
under centralized financing.  Hence decentralized financing cannot improve incentives in this case.
(2)  γ  ∈ [γ h, A].  According to Lemma 1, there exists two equilibria under decentralized financing.   In one
equilibrium every opportunistic firm restructures (g*(γ ) = γ  + ρ (1 - γ )), and in the other no opportunistic firm
restructures and market crashes (g*(γ ) = 0).  Is g*(γ ) = γ  + ρ (1 - γ ) still an equilibrium under centralized financing?
The answer is yes.  Anticipating all other opportunistic firms to engage in costly restructure (so that g(γ ) = γ  + ρ (1 -
γ )), an opportunistic firm realizes that it will be financed if and only if it chooses restructuring (since g(γ ) ≥  A).  In
other words, there exists an equilibrium under centralized financing where every opportunistic firm restructures.
Hence decentralized financing cannot improve incentives in this case.
(3)  γ  < A and γ  is arbitrarily close to A.  According to Lemma 1, there exists two equilibria under
decentralized financing.   In one equilibrium every opportunistic firm restructures (g*(γ ) = γ  + ρ (1 - γ )), and in the
other no opportunistic firm restructures and market crashes (g*(γ ) = 0).  Can g*(γ ) = 0 still be an equilibrium under
centralized financing? The answer is no since under centralized financing the large funding source must find it
worthwhile to finance some bad firms to stabilize the economy, given that γ  is arbitrarily close to A.  Is g*(γ ) = γ  +
ρ (1 - γ ) still an equilibrium under centralized financing? The answer is yes.   This is because, given γ  is arbitrarily
close to A, λ (γ ), the share of bad firms that are financed on the financial market must be arbitrarily small.
Accordingly, the budget constraint for an opportunistic firm is almost hard.  Hence every opportunistic firm will
restructure.
(4)  γ  < γ h and γ  is arbitrarily close to γ h.  According to Lemma 1, there exists a unique equilibrium of
market crash (g*(γ ) = 0) under decentralized financing.  In contrast, under centralized financing, g*(γ ) = γ  + ρ (1 - γ )
remains an equilibrium.  Suppose that an opportunistic firm anticipates all other opportunistic firms to restructure
and as a result g(γ ) = γ  + ρ (1 - γ ).  Since γ  is arbitrarily close to γ h, by the definition of γ h, the large funding source
must be willing to finance some bad firms to stabilize the economy when every opportunistic firm restructures.
However, given that γ  is arbitrarily close to γ h, the share of bad firms that are financed on the financial market must
be arbitrarily small when every opportunistic firm restructures.  Therefore, an opportunistic firm sees its budget
constraint as almost hard when anticipating all other opportunistic firms to restructure.  Hence, an opportunistic firm
will restructure when anticipating all other opportunistic firms to restructure.
Proof of Proposition 3:
I compare the equilibrium outcomes under decentralized financing with those under centralized financing.
I divide the comparison into three parts.
(1) γ  ≥  A.  Following the proof of Proposition 2, it is known that, for γ  ≥  A, there exists a unique
equilibrium g*(γ ) = γ  + ρ (1 - γ ) under both decentralized financing and centralized financing.  Therefore, for an
economy E(γ ) such that γ  ≥  A, centralized financing is as efficient as decentralized financing.
(2) γ  < γ h.  According to Lemma 1, there exists a unique equilibrium g*(γ ) = 0 under decentralized
financing for γ  < γ h.  But following the proof of Proposition 2, it can be concluded that there must exist γ s < γ h such
that for γ  ≥  γ s, there exists an equilibrium g*(γ ) = γ  + ρ (1 - γ )) under centralized financing.  In other words, for γ  ∈
[γ s, γ h) the equilibrium with g*(γ ) = γ  + ρ (1 - γ ) exists under centralized financing but not under decentralized
financing.
(3) γ  ∈  [γ h, A).  According to Lemma 1, there exists two equilibria g*(γ ) = 0 and g*(γ ) = γ  + ρ (1 - γ ) for γ  ∈
[γ h, A) under decentralized financing.  Following the proof of Proposition 2, it is known that the equilibrium g*(γ ) =
γ  + ρ (1 - γ ) also exists under centralized financing for γ  ∈  [γ h, A).  But it is also known from the proof of Proposition
2 that for some γ  γ  ∈  [γ h, A) the equilibrium with g*(γ ) = 0 no longer exists under centralized financing (perhaps
replaced by the equilibrium with g*(γ ) = γ ).
Using the “comparative efficiency criterion,” I therefore conclude that decentralized financing is less
efficient than centralized financing.   William Davidson Institute Working Paper Number 320
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Proof of Lemma 2:
For the equilibrium with g*(γ ) = γ  to exist under centralized financing, the large funding source must be
willing to finance given that no opportunistic firms choose to restructure (i.e., g(γ ) = γ ).  That is,
γα (q – w) - (A - γ )w ≥  0.
At the same time, each opportunistic firm must not be willing to restructure, anticipating that financing will take
place and that no other opportunistic firms will restructure, that is:
(A - γ )/(1 - γ )B > (1 - α )(q – w) – d
where (A - γ )/(1 - γ ) = λ (γ ) is the share of bad firms that are financed, which is also the probability that an
opportunistic firm to be financed.
Substituting µ  = α (q – w)/w and ν  = [(1 - α )(q – w) – d]/B, I then have
A/(1 + µ ) ≤  γ  < (A - ν )/(1 - ν )
as the necessary and sufficient condition for the equilibrium g(γ ) = γ  to exist under centralized financing.
Proof of Proposition 5:
The necessary condition is obvious and thus omitted.
Consider the sufficient condition.  Without loss of generality, I set γ c = γ  in condition [1] and [2].  This
gives me two thresholds for kc.  Define kc
1(γ ) and kc
2(γ ) such that condition [1] and [2] hold in equality respectively.
It is easy to verify that given Assumption 4, max{kc
1(γ ), kc
2(γ )} ≤  1 for γ  ≥  γ 1.  Therefore, the following allocations
are well defined.
•   if γ  ≥  γ 1, then kc(γ ) = max{A, kc
1(γ ), kc
2(γ )} and γ c(γ ) = γ ;
•   otherwise, kc(γ ) = max{A, kc
1(γ ), kc
2(γ )} and γ c(γ ) = γ  for γ  ∈  [γ 1, γ 2) and kc(γ ) = A and γ c(γ ) = γ  for γ  ∈
[γ , γ 1).
Given that kc(γ ) ≥  A and γ c(γ ) ≥  γ , the equilibrium g*(γ ) = γ  under centralized financing will be replaced by
g*(γ ) ∈  (γ , γ  +  ρ (1 -γ )] under the dual track system (by Lemma 5), and the equilibrium g*(γ ) = 0 does not exist under
the dual track system (since γ  ≥  γ ).  And if the equilibrium g*(γ ) = γ  +  ρ (1 -γ ) exists under centralized financing (i.e.,
if γ  ≥  max{γ 1, γ }), it must continue to exist under the dual track system given that kc(γ ) ≥  max{kc
1(γ ), kc
2(γ )}.
Proof of Lemma 8:
Notice first that, under a dual track system, the measure of opportunistic firms in the decentralized track is
ρ [1 – γ  - (kc(γ ) - γ c(γ ))].  Therefore the measure of firms restructuring in the decentralized track in an equilibrium
g*(γ ) ∈  (γ , γ  + ρ (1- γ )] is maximized when kc(γ ) - γ c(γ ) is minimized.
At the same time, an optimal allocation must maintain the equilibrium g*(γ ) = γ  + ρ (1- γ ) if the equilibrium
exists under centralized financing, and avoid the equilibrium g*(γ ) = 0 that does exist under centralized financing.
Hence (1) and (2).
The remaining issue is whether an allocation {kc(γ ), γ c(γ )} can induce an opportunistic firm in the
centralized track to restructure.  Ideally, an optimal allocation should also maximize such incentives, ceteris paribus.
There are two cases.  The first case is when the equilibrium g*(γ ) = γ  + ρ (1- γ ) exists under centralized
financing.  In this case, the equilibrium g *(γ ) = γ  + ρ (1- γ ) continues to exist under a dual track system provided that
{kc(γ ), γ c(γ )} satisfies condition [1] and [2].  But is there an allocation {kc(γ ), γ c(γ )} such that an opportunistic firm in
the centralized track will choose to restructure, even when anticipating no other opportunistic firms in the
centralized track to restructure?
The answer is no.  To see this, consider the incentive compatibility constraint for an opportunistic firm in
the centralized track:
[A – γ  - ρ (1 – γ )]/(kc - γ c) + ρ  ≤  ν .
For any γ , the left-hand side of this inequality is minimized at (A – γ )/(1 - γ ) when kc - γ c = 1 - γ .  But as γ 2 is defined
as (A – γ )/(1 - γ ) = ν , it then follows that for any γ  < γ 2, the minimal of A – γ  - ρ (1 – γ )]/(kc - γ c) + ρ  with respect to
kc - γ c must exceed ν .  Hence an opportunistic firm in the centralized track will not restructure when anticipating no
other opportunistic firms in the centralized track to restructure for γ  < γ 2, regardless of the allocation.
The second case is when the equilibrium g*(γ ) = γ  + ρ (1- γ ) does not exist under centralized financing (i.e,
γ  < γ 1).  In this case, there is an additional question as to whether there exists an allocation {kc(γ ), γ c(γ )} such that an
opportunistic firm in the centralized track will choose to restructure, when anticipating all other opportunistic firms
in the centralized track to restructure.  Using the logic similar to what is presented above, it is straightforward to
verify that an opportunistic firm in the centralized track will not restructure when anticipating no other opportunistic
firms in the centralized track to restructure for γ  < γ 1, regardless of the allocation.William Davidson Institute Working Paper Number 320
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Since it is not possible for an allocation {kc(γ ), γ c(γ )} to induce an opportunistic firm in the centralized track
to restructure (if it is unwilling to do so under centralized financing), the optimal allocation must minimize kc(γ ) -
γ c(γ ) subject to (1) and (2).
Proof of Lemma 9:
Consider first the case where the equilibrium g*(γ ) = γ  + ρ (1 – γ ) does not exist under centralized financing,
i.e., γ  < γ 1.  In this case, even when anticipating all other opportunistic firms to restructure, the budget constraint
faced by an opportunistic firm in the centralized track is too soft for it to undertake restructuring.  In particular,
λ (γ ) = [A – γ  - ρ (1 – γ )]/[(1 - ρ )(kc* - γ c*)]
which is at least as large as [A – γ  - ρ (1 – γ )]/[(1 - ρ )(1 - γ )].  But according to the definition of γ 1, for all γ  < γ 1 even
the softness of [A – γ  - ρ (1 – γ )]/[(1 - ρ )(1 - γ )] is too much for an opportunistic firm to restructure.  Therefore, an
opportunistic firm will never restructure in the centralized track for γ  < γ 1.
Consider next the case where the equilibrium g*(γ ) = γ  + ρ (1 – γ ) does exist under centralized financing,
i.e., γ  ∈  [γ 1, γ 2).  In this case, the question becomes whether an opportunistic firm in the centralized track will
restructure when anticipating no other opportunistic firms in the centralized track to restructure.
39  Again, the budget
constraint will be too soft for an opportunistic firm in the centralized track to restructure.  In particular, anticipating
no other opportunistic firms in the centralized track to restructure, the perceived budget softness is given by:
λ (γ ) = [A – γ  - ρ (1 – γ  - kc* + γ c*)]/(kc* - γ c*)
which is at least as large as (A – γ )/(1 - γ ).  But according to the definition of γ 2, for all γ  < γ 2 even the softness of (A
– γ )/(1 - γ ) is too much for an opportunistic firm to restructure.  Therefore, for γ  < γ 2 an opportunistic firm in the
centralized track will not restructure while anticipating no other opportunistic firms to restructure in the centralized
track.
                                                          
39 Opportunistic firms in the decentralized track will restructure.William Davidson Institute Working Paper Number 320
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Figure 1–a Centralized Financing Figure 1–b Decentralized Financing
      Figure 1
Figure 2 – a Figure 2 - b
     Figure 2
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40 It is straightforward to show that γ 1 <γ 2 < A.  Consider γ  such that γ  < A but sufficiently close to A, the share of bad firms that
are financed on the financial market must be negligible, therefore, the budget constraint is almost hard and as a result an
opportunistic firm will always restructure.  In other words, it must be true that γ  > γ 2.  Hence γ 2 < A.  In addition, since by
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